The Resurrection of Privacy?

The video below is the slideshow of my presentation this morning at the Society of Legal Scholars conference in Nottingham – and what follows it are some brief notes to support it. Some of this is speculative and some of it is contentious – particularly in relation to the relative importance of corporate and governmental surveillance – and this is an early stage of this research, though it builds on the work in my book, Internet Privacy Rights. I should also note that this is a development of the paper I gave at BILETA earlier this year: ‘who killed privacy?’

 

The Resurrection of Privacy?

In 1999, Scott McNealy, then CEO of Sun Microsystems, famously said:

“You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”

Events and developments since 1999 have hardly improved the prospects for privacy: the growth of social networking, technological developments like smartphones, geo-location, business ideas such as behavioural tracking and, most recently, the revelations from Edward Snowden about the near universal surveillance systems of the NSA, GCHQ and others. If privacy was in trouble in 1999, the argument that it is at least close to death in 2014 is much stronger.

That brings two questions:

  • If privacy is dead, who killed it? Did we kill it ourselves? Is it the activities of government agencies like the NSA and GCHQ, or of businesses like Google and Facebook?
  • If if privacy is in fact dead, is there a possible route towards its resurrection?

Suspect 1: us!

On the face of it, it might appear as though we ourselves have simply given up on privacy. We’ve killed it ourselves by embracing all the privacy-invasive technology that’s offered to us, by failing even to read privacy policies, by allowing the intelligence services to do whatever they want, with barely a murmur of protest. More than a billion of us have joined Facebook, for example, a service based at least in some ways on giving up on privacy, sharing our most intimate information.

That, however, is not the whole story. In many ways it appears that what we have done has been through a lack of awareness rather than by deliberate decisions. The extent to which people understand how systems like Facebook work is hard to gauge – but the surprise that people show when bad things happen suggests that there isn’t a great deal of awareness. It also appears that people are becoming more aware – and as they become more aware, they’re making more privacy-based decisions, taking control of their privacy settings and so forth.

Further, when we’re given the chance to see how intelligence agencies work, we don’t seem to be happy about it – though less, it has to be acknowledged, in the UK than in many other countries. Even so, when the Communications Data Bill was put under full scrutiny, it was rejected – in part because of the public reaction. Further, studies show that people don’t like behavioural advertising – and dislike it more when they learn more about how it works.

All this suggests that we aren’t really the key to the death of privacy: we’re more like unwitting accomplices.

Suspect 2: the NSA and GCHQ

The revelations of Edward Snowden about the surveillance activities sent shockwaves through the internet. Many people had already believed that the NSA, GCHQ and other agencies performed surveillance on the internet – Snowden’s revelations seemed to prove it, and to suggest that the level of surveillance was greater even than that feared by the more extreme of conspiracy theorists. Not just had they been gathering telephony and internet data and building (in the US) massive data centres, but they’d been accessing the servers of the big commercial internet providers, tapping into undersea cables, intercepting traffic between server sites and undermining encryption systems – and much more. The level of privacy invasion is extreme.

However, until Edward Snowden revealed all of this, the agencies were working largely in secret – and while this still constitutes a major invasion of privacy, the impact on people’s behaviour is much smaller. If we don’t know we’re being watched, our actions aren’t chilled – and our beliefs about privacy are not changed. Moreover, the kind of harms done to people by surveillance by the NSA and GCHQ are indirect, at least for most people. Finally, and most importantly, if it were not for the commercial operators’ surveillance, the NSA and GCHQ would have far less to ‘feed’ on.

All this is not to dismiss the role of the intelligence services or indeed the impact of their surveillance activities – they should be resisted with the utmost vigour – but in terms of the death of privacy, they can be seen more as opportunist accomplices, rather than instigators.

Suspect 3: businesses like Facebook and Google

The role of the commercial operators on the internet, on the other hand, is both deeper and more significant either than is often believed or than the role of governments and government agencies on their own. The commercial entities have contributed to the decline of privacy in three kinds of ways:

  • Systematic – commercial entities have undermined privacy both in technological and business model senses, developing technologies to invade privacy and business models that depend on systematic and essentially covert gathering of personal data. Businesses have also lobbied strongly to reduce the effectiveness of legal privacy protection. In Europe they have done their best to undermine and weaken data protection – including the on-going reform process. They continue to do so, for example in relation to the right to be forgotten. In the US, they have contributed to the effective scuppering of the Do Not Track initiative.
  • Cooperative – businesses have been working with governments, sometimes willingly, sometimes unwillingly, sometimes knowingly and sometimes unknowingly. The extent of this cooperation and the extent to which is has been willing is unclear – though recent statements from the NSA have suggested that they did know about it and did cooperate willingly. Further, they kept this cooperation secret – until it was revealed by the Snowden leaks.
  • Normative – businesses have been attempting to undermine the idea that privacy is something to value and something of importance. Mark Zuckerberg’s suggestion that ‘privacy is no longer a social norm’ is reflected not just words but actions, encouraging people to ‘share’ information of all kinds rather than consider the privacy impact. Further, they continue to develop technologies that invade privacy inherently – from geo-technology to wearable health monitoring and things like Google Glass.

All this combines to make the role of the businesses look most significant – if anyone is guilty of killing privacy, it is Facebook and Google rather than the NSA and GCHQ. Moreover, the harms to most people possible from corporate surveillance are both tangible and more likely than harms from the NSA and GCHQ: impact on things like insurance, credit ratings, employability, relationships and so forth are not just theoretical.

As Bruce Schneier put it:

“The NSA didn’t wake up and say, ‘Let’s just spy on everybody.’ They looked up and said, ‘Wow, corporations are spying on everybody. Let’s get ourselves a copy.’”

And as Timothy Garton Ash said when considering the Stasi:

“…the Minister for State Security observed that the results achieved by his ministry ‘would be unthinkable without the energetic help and support of the citizens of our country’. ‘For once,’ I comment, ‘what the Minister says is true.’”

Where the Stasi needs the citizen informers, the new surveillance programmes need the ISPs and the internet giants – the Googles, Facebooks, Microsofts, Yahoo!s, Apples and so forth. That is what makes their role in the reverse so important.

The resurrection of privacy

In the post-Snowden environment, at least on the surface, businesses have started to take a more ‘pro-privacy’ stance. Whether that meaningful, or they are just paying lip service to it, has yet to be seen. Their role, however, is crucial.

Reversing the three roles noted above – systematic, cooperative and normative – could produce a positive impact for privacy, effectively being a part of the ‘resurrection’ of privacy:

  • Systematic – businesses could play a part by building more robust technology and developing more privacy-friendly business models
  • Cooperative – and Resistant. Businesses could cooperate more with civil society and academia in working towards privacy – and could do more to resist being co-opted by governments, not just being more transparent in their dealings with governments but acting as a barrier and protection for their users in their dealings with governments.
  • Normative – businesses could play a part in changing the message so that it becomes clearer that privacy is a social norm.

At the moment it seems unlikely that businesses will do very much of this – but there are a few signs that are positive. Real names policies have been relaxed on Google +, and even Facebook has shown some moves in that direction. All the big companies are doing more to secure their systems – encryption is more common, both in the infrastructure and in user systems. Google does at least seem to be making some attempt to cooperate with the right to be forgotten – though whether these attempts are being done in good faith has yet to be seen.

It will probably take a miracle – resurrections generally do – but miracles do sometimes happen.

DRIP: web-mail and web-browsing….

One of the big questions concerning data retention and the hastily-passed DRIP is whether it applies to web-browsing activities. Indeed, Julian Huppert MP asked the question during that all-too-brief debate in parliament, and was assured that it did not. I was far from convinced by the answer, and remain far from convinced, particularly given the idea that this ‘update’ to powers is intended to cover activities like webmail and social networking messages. Some colleagues have been asking questions, and a reliable source within one of the US companies that operates webmail (amongst other things) told us that they don’t expect the data retention powers to apply, given that they have never done so and the government made clear that there was no change in that through DRIP. They added further that as a US company, they are in a very different situation to UK providers.

That leaves us in a very interesting situation. If you’re communicating by webmail or social networking, how can your activities be caught? I can see only two ways: directly from the webmail company, or by capturing web-browsing through the ISP. If there are other ways, I’d like to know… because in the current circumstances I can see only three options:

  1. That webmail and social networking will not be covered by DRIP. That’s almost inconceivable, given the intentions of DRIP and the extent to which communications of the kind that those behind DRIP want to capture take place on webmail and social networks; or
  2. That the non-UK webmail and social network providers have been misled, and DRIP will be used to compel them to gather and hold communications data concerning activities on their services; or
  3. That Julian Huppert – and parliament, and the people of the UK – has been misled, and DRIP will be used to gather web-browsing activities.

If there’s another option, I’d like to know it. It’s entirely possible, as I’ve been wrong often before, but I can’t see it immediately.

My instinct is that the third option is the most likely – and that the intent of DRIP was always to gather web-browsing activity. If we’d had proper time for scrutiny of the bill, and to get experts to ask questions in committee, we might know the answers – and make sure that appropriate balances and controls are put in place. We didn’t. I have a strong suspicion that was entirely intentional too.

DRIP: normalising the surveillance state.

Yesterday’s shameful passing of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, nodded through without amendment and without even the perceived need for a vote in the House of Lords, was not just very bad news for the UK, it was bad news for the world. The ease with which it was passed, the speed with which it was passed, and the breadth of the powers granted send signals around the world. Some of us have been warning about this effect for a long time - what we do in the UK is being watched around the world. If we, as a supposedly mature, liberal democracy believe that mass surveillance is OK, then that means that anyone could do it. Indeed, that any sensible state should do it.

I’ve been accused of paranoia by making such a suggestion. After all, this is just ‘emergency’ legislation, a mere stop-gap while a proper review of investigatory powers and data gathering goes on. Well,  within a few short hours of the passing of DRIP, its echoes were already being heard the other side of the world. Australia’s Attorney-General, George Brandis, used DRIP as an example, seemingly to help push forward his own proposals for data retention. As reported in ZDNet, he said:

“The question of data retention is under active consideration by the government. I might point out to you as recently as yesterday, the House of Commons passed a new data retention statute. This is very much the way in which western nations are going,”

This is how it goes – and one of the many reasons that the passing of DRIP yesterday was so shameful. If the UK does it, Australia does it. Then New Zealand and Canada.  Each new country adds to the weight of the argument. Everyone’s doing it, why not us? If the UK thinks it needs this to keep its citizens safe, we need it too? By the time the long-distant sunset clause kicks in, the end of 2016, every new country that’s added a data retention law to its books, however temporary, will be another reason to extend our own security services’ powers. It’s a vicious or virtuous circle, depending on your perspective.

Of course the normalisation works in different ways too. Less scrupulous nations will be able to say that if the Brits do it, so can we – and we won’t be able to claim that they’re oppressing their population, if we do the same to our own. Further, our security services will require more and more technology to do the surveillance – and the people who develop that technology will be looking for new markets. They may sell them to the Australians – but more likely they’ll find ready markets in governments with less of a tradition of liberalism and democracy. There’s a fine selection of such nations all around the world. They’ll also find markets of other kinds – businesses wishing to use surveillance for their own purposes… whether scrupulous or not. The very criminals that the supporters of DRIP like to scare us with will be looking too – there are so many uses for surveillance that it’s hard to know where to start.

Well, actually, it should have been easy to know where to start. To make a stand. To try to normalise freedom and privacy, respect for citizens fundamental rights and a willingness for open, honest debate on the subject. That, however, would have required rejecting DRIP. We didn’t do that. Shame on us.

 

DRIP: Parliament in disrepute?

I watched and listened to the parliamentary debate on the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers bill (DRIP) with a kind of grim fascination. The outcome was always inevitable – I knew that, as, I think did all opponents of the bill – but the debate itself seemed to me to be worth paying attention to. Not really in terms of the result, but in terms of the process, and in terms of the way in which parliament was engaging with the issues. There were, it has to be said, some quite wonderful speeches in opposition to the bill, and from many different directions. MPs like John McDonnell, Dominic Raab, Caroline Lucas, Diane Abbott, Pete Wishart, David Winnick, Duncan Hames, Clive Betts, Charles Walker, Dennis Skinner and of course Tom Watson and David Davis were all excellent. Indeed, as someone said at the time, the opponents didn’t lose the debate, they lost the vote.

Therein lies the problem – what was the point of the debate? The chamber was all-but empty for most of it. In the middle of the debate, I got so angry I tweeted a picture of the chamber – with a comment attached. The tweet went a bit wild…. retweeted 870 times at the last count, and included by Liberty in their summary of the debate.

Screen Shot 2014-07-16 at 07.32.41

I did, however, also get some serious criticism for the tweet. Some suggested I had faked it, because I missed out the caption at the bottom. Fair enough – I was too angry to get the screen capture right, but I don’t fake things. I satirise and parody, tease and joke – but I don’t fake. For avoidance of doubt, I took another soon after, this time with the caption:

Screen Shot 2014-07-15 at 16.36.42

Another criticism I received, quite aggressively, was that it was misleading to tweet the picture, and that most of the MPs were likely to be in their offices or their committee rooms, working hard, but following and listening to the debate as it was being broadcast throughout the house. That may well be true – and in no way was I suggesting that MPs don’t work hard. They do – well, a great many of them do – but at this particular moment, and on this particular issue, their attention was elsewhere, as was their physical presence.

I don’t blame the MPs for that part of it. Of course their attention was elsewhere – after all, they’d had this emergency debate foisted upon them at the last minute, and they already have busy lives and huge amounts of work to do, particularly with the parliamentary recess coming up, and with a reshuffle happening at that very moment. Naturally, MPs are distracted by the reshuffle – coalition MPs because their jobs are on the line, Labour MPs because they have to be ready to respond to the reshuffle. Naturally their jobs, their careers, their responsibilities come first.

That, though, is really where my tweet comes in. I said ‘This is how seriously our MPs take our privacy’. I meant it. They showed disrespect to the issue not just by not listening to the debate, but by accepting a process that meant that they only had a few hours of debate to listen to, and almost nothing to read or discuss about it. They accepted an unnecessary fast-tracking, effectively on trust – because they don’t really take our privacy seriously.

Frankly, I’m not convinced that they were listening to the debate – but if they were, that makes their voting even worse. If they listened to the debate and still voted the way they did, in a way that’s even more depressing than the more natural assumption that they were largely ignoring the debate and voting according to the whip. It would mean that they either didn’t understand the strong arguments against the bill, both analytical and impassioned – or they dismissed them as unimportant. Either way, it suggests they didn’t take our privacy seriously. At least, not seriously enough to think it needed proper, lengthy, public debate bringing in expert opinions and analysis. I’m a legal academic, specialising in internet privacy. I’ve written a book on the subject, and I’m one of the signatories of this open letter concerning DRIP – and frankly I haven’t had nearly enough time to properly analyse and understand this bill and its implications. We’ve only had a chance for the most basic of analyses – and if I can’t, how much understanding can MPs have of it?

As David Winnick, a veteran MP and member of the Home Affairs Select Committee put it:

“I consider this to be an outright abuse of parliamentary procedure. Even if one is in favour of what the home secretary intends to do, to do so in the manner in which it is intended, to pass all stages in one go, surely makes a farce of our responsibilities as MPs”

He’s right. It does. It brings parliament into disrepute. MPs should be ashamed of themselves.

Open letter from UK legal academic experts re DRIP

I’m one of the signatories to the letter below – not just a few, but many very serious legal academics, some of the most distinguished in the field.


 

Tuesday 15th July 2014

To all Members of Parliament,

Re: An open letter from UK internet law academic experts

On Thursday 10 July the Coalition Government (with support from the Opposition) published draft emergency legislation, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill (“DRIP”). The Bill was posited as doing no more than extending the data retention powers already in force under the EU Data Retention Directive, which was recently ruled incompatible with European human rights law by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the joined cases brought by Digital Rights Ireland (C-293/12) and Seitlinger and Others (C-594/12) handed down on 8 April 2014.

In introducing the Bill to Parliament, the Home Secretary framed the legislation as a response to the CJEU’s decision on data retention, and as essential to preserve current levels of access to communications data by law enforcement and security services. The government has maintained that the Bill does not contain new powers.

On our analysis, this position is false. In fact, the Bill proposes to extend investigatory powers considerably, increasing the British government’s capabilities to access both communications data and content. The Bill will increase surveillance powers by authorising the government to;

  • compel any person or company – including internet services and telecommunications companies – outside the United Kingdom to execute an interception warrant (Clause 4(2));
  • compel persons or companies outside the United Kingdom to execute an interception warrant relating to conduct outside of the UK (Clause 4(2));
  • compel any person or company outside the UK to do anything, including complying with technical requirements, to ensure that the person or company is able, on a continuing basis, to assist the UK with interception at any time (Clause 4(6)).
  • order any person or company outside the United Kingdom to obtain, retain and disclose communications data (Clause 4(8)); and
  • order any person or company outside the United Kingdom to obtain, retain and disclose communications data relating to conduct outside the UK (Clause 4(8)).

The legislation goes far beyond simply authorising data retention in the UK. In fact, DRIP attempts to extend the territorial reach of the British interception powers, expanding the UK’s ability to mandate the interception of communications content across the globe. It introduces powers that are not only completely novel in the United Kingdom, they are some of the first of their kind globally.

Moreover, since mass data retention by the UK falls within the scope of EU law, as it entails a derogation from the EU’s e-privacy Directive (Article 15, Directive 2002/58), the proposed Bill arguably breaches EU law to the extent that it falls within the scope of EU law, since such mass surveillance would still fall foul of the criteria set out by the Court of Justice of the EU in the Digital Rights and Seitlinger judgment.

Further, the bill incorporates a number of changes to interception whilst the purported urgency relates only to the striking down of the Data Retention Directive. Even if there was a real emergency relating to data retention, there is no apparent reason for this haste to be extended to the area of interception.

DRIP is far more than an administrative necessity; it is a serious expansion of the British surveillance state. We urge the British Government not to fast track this legislation and instead apply full and proper parliamentary scrutiny to ensure Parliamentarians are not mislead as to what powers this Bill truly contains.

Signed,

 

Dr Subhajit Basu, University of Leeds

Dr Paul Bernal, University of East Anglia

Professor Ian Brown, Oxford University

Ray Corrigan, The Open University

Professor Lilian Edwards, University of Strathclyde

Dr Andres Guadamuz, University of Sussex

Dr Theodore Konstadinides, University of Surrey

Professor Chris Marsden, University of Sussex

Dr Karen Mc Cullagh, University of East Anglia

Dr. Daithí Mac Síthigh, Newcastle University

Professor Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Oxford University

Professor David Mead, University of East Anglia

Professor Andrew Murray, London School of Economics

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex
Julia Powles, University of Cambridge

Judith Rauhofer, University of Edinburgh

Professor Burkhard Schafer, University of Edinburgh

Professor Lorna Woods, University of Essex

Theresa May – even more reason to worry about DRIP….

Screen Shot 2014-07-14 at 19.00.29I watched and listened to the session of the Home Affairs Select Committee this afternoon: Home Secretary Theresa May was being questioned about a number of things, including DRIP. The session was, I suspect, intended to reassure us that everything was OK, and that we needn’t worry about DRIP. The result, for me at least, was precisely the opposite: it left me feeling even more concerned.

Theresa May is the minister responsible for DRIP, and her performance before the committee suggested neither competence in managing the process nor an understanding of what the issues were or why people would be concerned. It was a performance that mixed the incompetent with the contemptuous, not just failing to provide answers but suggesting that she didn’t think the questions were even worth asking.

Many things about it were poor. May failed to explain why the legislation had to be rushed through – she could not (or would not) explain why nothing had happened publicly since the ECJ ruling in April, and she could not (or would not) provide details as to why there was pressure now. Next, she could not answer the key question on extraterritoriality – whether the powers in DRIP were in fact new. She claimed to have had advice that the powers did exist before – but couldn’t say whether or not they had ever been used.

Most importantly, though, when pushed by David Winnick on the key point – compliance with the ECJ ruling that struck down the Data Retention Directive, she fumbled and obfuscated when asked about the ruling. She either did not understand or deliberately pretended not to understand that the key point of the ruling was that blanket gathering of data was in conflict with fundamental rights. Ultimately, that’s the real point here – and she either could not or would not answer it.

To put it directly, the ruling said that blanket gathering of data, gathering data on everyone, regardless of suspicion, guilt or innocence, or any particular reason, was not appropriate. That is what the Data Retention Directive (DRD) did, and why the ECJ struck it down. They’re right, too. This isn’t some esoteric or obscure point, it’s a fundamental one, parallel to the idea of the presumption of innocence. The DRD did it, and DRIP does it – which is why at the very least we need to discuss it in much more depth. The session with Theresa May left me thinking that she either didn’t understand it or she dismissed it as unimportant. Now you may disagree on proportionality, and believe that mass surveillance is a proportionate response, but to dismiss the issue as unimportant and unworthy of discussion is indefensible.

Mind you, I don’t think people will be talking that much about this – because Theresa May’s performance when questioned about the appointment and subsequent resignation of Lady Butler-Sloss was even worse, if that can be believed. All in all, Theresa May looked neither trustworthy nor competent. It’s hard to imagine someone less appropriate to trust with the open-ended and extensive powers granted by something like DRIP.

DRIP: a shabby process for a shady law.

[An earlier version of this post appeared at The Justice Gap, here]

Thursday’s announcement by David Cameron and Nick Clegg that the coalition was going to expedite emergency surveillance legislation is something that should concern all of us, not just privacy activists. The speed with which the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers bill (‘DRIP’) is being brought into play, the lack of consultation and the breadth of its powers should matter to everyone. There is a reason that legislation usually requires time and careful consideration – and with a contentious issue like surveillance this is especially true. This is a shabby process, for what seems to be a very shady law. And, as David Davis MP has suggested, the ‘emergency’ is theatrical, not real. The need for new legislation was entirely predictable – and politicians and civil servants should have known this.

A predictable emergency

The trigger for the legislation was the ruling by the ECJ, on 8th April, that the Data Retention Directive was invalid – more than three months ago – but the signs that new legislation was needed have been there for far longer. The ruling by the ECJ exceeded the expectations of privacy advocates – but not that significantly, and the declaration that the directive was invalid should have been an outcome that civil servants and politicians were prepared for. Indeed, the Data Retention Directive has been subject to significant challenge since its inception in 2005. Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection Supervisor in 2010 called it:

“…without doubt the most privacy invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU in terms of scale and the number of people it affects.”

Across Europe there have been protests and legal challenges to data retention throughout its history, from 30,000 people on the streets of Germany in 2007 to the declaration that data retention itself was unconstitutional in Romania. The challenge that eventually brought down the directive began in 2013.

The signs have been there in the UK too, and for far longer than three months. The Communications Data Bill – more commonly and appropriately known as the Snoopers’ Charter – was effectively abandoned well over a year ago, after a specially set-up parliamentary committee, after taking detailed evidence, issued a damning report. At that stage, even before the revelations of Edward Snowden reared their ugly head, the need for further legislation was evident.

So why, given all these warnings, has this emergency been manufactured, and why is legislation being pushed through so quickly? Is it that those behind the bill are concerned that if it received full and detailed scrutiny, the full scale and impact of the bill will become evident and, like the Snoopers’ Charter before it, it will fail? It is hard not to think that this has played some part in the tactics being employed here. What would there be to lose by delaying this a few months?

Companies like data too…

The suggestion that if the legislation isn’t pushed through this quickly then companies will suddenly start deleting all their communications data is naïve to say the least. Firstly, it’s hardly in most communications providers’ interest to delete all that data – actually, rather the opposite. Back in 2007, Google attempted to use the existence of data retention legislation as an excuse not to delete search logs – companies generally like having more data, as they (just like the authorities) believe they can get value from it. Moreover, businesses don’t often change their practices at the drop of a hat, even if they want to. They might, however, if they’re required to by law – and that may well be the real key here. Legal challenges to specific practices by specific companies in terms of data retention may well be in the offing – but this would take time, far more time than the few days – less than a week – that MPs are being given to pass this legislation.

Fundamental Rights

The underlying point here is that there is a reason that the Data Retention Directive was declared invalid by the ECJ, and a reason that both privacy advocates and academics have been concerned about it from the very beginning. The mass collection of communications data breaches fundamental rights – and DRIP, just like the Communications Data Bill before it, does authorise the mass collection of this data. It has the same fundamental flaws as that bill – and a few extras to boot. With the very limited time available to review the bill so far, it appears to extend rather than limit the powers available through the contentious Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) rather than limit them or modernise them (see for example the analysis by David Allen Green in the FT here – registration needed), and attempt to extend powers outside the UK in a way that is at the very least contentious – and in need of much more scrutiny and consideration.

Most importantly, it still works on the assumption that there is no problem with collecting data, and that the only place for controls or targeting is at the accessing stage. This is a fundamentally flawed assumption – morally, legally and practically. At the moral level, it treats us all as suspects. Legally it has been challenged and beaten many times – consistently in the European Court of Human Rights, in cases from as far back as Leander in 1987, and now in the ECJ in the declaration of invalidity of the Data Retention Directive. Practically, it means that data gathered is vulnerable in many ways – from the all too evident risks of function creep that RIPA has demonstrated over the years (dog-fouling, fly-tippers etc) to vulnerability to leaking, hacking, human error, human malice and so forth. Moreover, it is the gathering of data that creates the chilling effect – impacting upon our freedom of speech, of assembly and association and so forth. This isn’t just about privacy.

Safeguards?

Nick Clegg made much of the concessions and safeguards in the new bill, emphasising that this isn’t a Snoopers’ Charter Mark 2, but it is hard to be enthusiastic about them at this stage. There is a sunset clause, meaning that DRIP will expire in December 2016 – but there is nothing in the bill itself to say that it won’t be replaced by similar ‘emergency’ legislation, railroaded through parliament in a similar way. Moreover, December 2016 is well after the election – and the Lib Dems are currently unlikely to still have any influence at that stage. Julian Huppert in particular, my MP in Cambridge, is in a very precarious position. Without him, it’s hard to see much Lib Dem resistance to either the Tories or the Labour Party who set the ball rolling on mass surveillance state in the Blair years.

The rest of the safeguards are difficult to evaluate at this stage – they were originally said to be contained in secondary legislation that was not published with the bill itself, but when that secondary legislation was actually released, at around 4pm on Friday afternoon, it contained almost none of what had been promised. For example, the suggestion that the number of bodies able to use RIPA was to be restricted, was entirely absent. This list doesn’t just include the police and intelligence services, but pretty much all local authorities, and bodies like the food standards agency and the charities commission – another part of the function creep of RIPA. The breadth and depth of the surveillance that this bill, in combination with RIPA, would not only allow but effectively normalise, is something that should be of the deepest concern to anyone who takes civil liberties seriously.

The shabbiest of processes

This is just one part of the shabbiness of the process. Two more crucial documents,  ‘Impact Assessments’ performed by the Home Office concerning the data retention and interception aspects of the bill, were also released – but without even a mention, so that the first that was heard of them by most concerned people was early on Saturday morning, when vigilant investigators found them all but hidden on the Home Office website. Two documents, full of technical details looking at why the laws were ‘needed’ and what the risks and benefits of the laws would be, the alternatives and so forth, pretty much hidden away. These, together with the Bill itself and the Regulations, combine to produce something with a serious level of both legal and technical complexity – something that needs very careful study and expert analysis. And to do this analysis, we are given essentially one weekend, and no warning.

How serious this is was highlighted by a brief twitter conversation between David Allen Green and MP Julian Huppert this morning:

Screen Shot 2014-07-12 at 18.53.05

 

David Allen Green (@JackofKent) is asking a straight and direct, technical and legal question – and Julian Huppert can’t answer it. Julian is perhaps the most technically expert of the entire House of Commons – if he doesn’t understand the bill, its impact and how it changes the current situation, how much less can other MPs? And yet they are expected to debate the bill on Monday, and pass it almost immediately. This is patently wrong – and highlights exactly why parliament generally has significant time for analysis and for debate, and parliamentary committees call experts to give testimony, to tease out these kinds of answers. Julian Huppert should not be criticised for not knowing the answer to the question – but he should be criticised for supporting a bill without allowing the time for these questions to be asked, investigated and answered. They need to be.

This is an wholly unsatisfactory state of affairs. Indeed, the whole thing is highly unsatisfactory, and in a democratic society, it should be unacceptable. That our MPs seem willing to accept it speaks volumes.

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The key documents can be found here:- study them if you have time!

The draft bill

The draft regulations

The impact assessment for interception

The impact assessment for data retention.