Before issuing a ‘Technical Capability Notice’ – for example to remove encryption – a number of things must be taken into account:
One thing, however, notably absent from this is any other effect on people other than ‘the person (or description of person) to whom it relates’. That, however, could be the crux of the problem. In the Apple vs FBI case, for example, the objection that Apple have to doing what the FBI want, is not the effect it might have on the (deceased) owner of the particular iPhone at all. Rather, the objection relates to the effect first of all on other users of iPhones, next on other people who might be subject to similar court orders, and thirdly on the overall balance between security of individuals and the perceived security of the state.
None of these objections would seem to count in relation to a Technical Capability Notice. Further, the broader context, the implications for human rights and so forth simply don’t enter the equation.
Perhaps they should.